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Note

Liability of a Successor Corporation
for Products Defectively
Manufactured by a Predecessor
Jones v. Johnson Machine and Press Company, 211
Neb. 724, 320 N.W.2d 481 (1982).
I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 8, 1977, Danny Jones lost several fingers when his hand
was caught in a Johnson punch press while attempting to free a
piece of metal that had become jammed in the press., Although
persons injured by allegedly defective products can normally seek
compensation for their injuries from the manufacturer of the
machine,2 and although the Johnson line of presses continues to
be manufactured, Jones' claim was barred because the original
manufacturer of the press had sold its business and dissolved
years before the injury.3
The question of whether a corporate successor can be held liable for the injuries caused by a product defectively manufactured
by its predecessor has, until recently, been governed exclusively
by the law of corporations. As the law of strict products liability
has developed, some courts have eschewed the traditional corporate law analysis of such liability in favor of an analytical framework more readily disposed toward the underlying policy
justifications of strict liability. 4 In Jones v. Johnson Machine and
1. Brief for Appellant at 5, Jones v. Johnson Mach. and Press Co., 211 Neb. 724,
320 N.W.2d 481 (1982).
2. Nebraska adopted the doctrine of strict liability for manufacturers of defective products in Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971).
For a discussion of Nebraska products liability law, see infra notes 104-07 and
accompanying text.
3. For a more detailed factual recitation and a discussion of the subsequent cor-

porate history of Johnson Machine and Press Company, see infra notes 66-67
and accompanying text.
4. A number of policy concerns have been offered to support the imposition of
strict liability for defectively manufactured products. The following list is
representative:
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Press Co., however, the Nebraska Supreme Court chose not to follow this trend, and instead relied on the traditional corporate law
analysis.
This Note will first discuss the traditional corporate law approach, its expansion and its abandonment by some courts. It will
then discuss the results reached by other courts faced with the
same corporate history involved in Jones. Finally, it will analyze
Jones in light of those cases, and suggest alternative holdings
which would be preferable to the result obtained in Jones.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS AGAINST
SUCCESSORS TO CORPORATE ASSET

SALES
A.

The Traditional Corporate Law Rule

A corporation wishing to dissolve has several options available.
The assets may be distributed directly to the shareholders, or they
may be acquired by a third party and the consideration distributed
A. The consumer finds it too difficult to prove negligence against the
manufacturer.
B. Strict liability provides an effective and necessary incentive to
manufacturers to make their products as safe as possible.
C. Res ipsa loquitur is in fact applied, in some cases, to impose liability upon producers who have not in fact been negligent; therefore
negligence should be dispensed with.
D. Reputable manufacturers do in fact stand behind their products,
replacing or repairing those which prove to be defective; and many of
them have express agreements to do so. Therefore all should be responsible when an injury results from a normal use of the product.
E. The manufacturer is in a better position to protect against harm,
by insuring against liability for it, and, by adding the cost of the insurance to the price of his product, to pass the loss on to the general
public.
F. Strict liability already can be accomplished by a series of actions,
in which the consumer first recovers from the retailer on a warranty,
and liability on warranties is then carried back through the intermediate dealers to the manufacturer. The process is time-consuming,
expensive, and wasteful; there should be a short-cut.
G. By placing the product on the market, the seller represents to
the public that it is fit; and he intends and expects that it will be
purchased and consumed in reliance upon that representation. The
middleman is no more than a conduit, a mechanical device through
which the thing sold reaches the consumer.
H. The costs of accidents should be placed on the party best able to
determine whether there are means to prevent that accident. When
those means are less expensive than the costs of such accidents, responsibility for implementing them should be placed on the party
best able to do so.
W. PaOssE , J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATFRLUS ON TORTS 764-65
(7th ed. 1982).
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to the shareholders. Since an intact, going business concern is
generally considered to be more valuable than the sum of its
parts,5 sound business policy dictates that both the acquiring and
disposing entities attempt to effect the transfer of the entire
business.
There are three ways in which a corporation can acquire or ab7
sorb another corporation:6 (1) statutory merger or consolidation,
(2) purchase of the stock of the acquired corporation, and (3)
purchase of the acquired corporation's assets. Both merger and
purchase of stock result in the acquiring corporation's assumption
of the liabilities of the disposing corporation. 8 These liabilities include claims by persons injured by defective products manufactured by the disposing corporation. 9 Conversely, purchase of the
acquired corporation's assets generally does not result in assumption of the acquired corporation's liabilities by the buyer1O
5. 1 A. DEWING, THE FiNANcIAL PoUcY OF CORPoRATioNs 281 (5th ed. 1953).
6. See generally B. Fox & E. Fox, Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers, in 13A
BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS §§ 23.01-23.04 (1975); Stephan, Acquisition Trouble
Spots, 21 Bus. LAw. 401, 401-03 (1966).
7. See 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPoRATIoNs § 7041
(rev. perm. ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as FLETCHER]. The manner in which
assumption of the seller's liabilities is treated is the same for both merger
and consolidation. Id. Further references, therefore, will be only to mergers.
8. A merger is a "combination involving the fusion of two constituent corporations, pursuant to a formal agreement executed with reference to specific
statutory merger provisions, under which the stock of one corporation ... is
converted into stock of the other." W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1444 (5th ed. 1980). For an example of a typical
statutory merger scheme, see MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 71 (rev. ed. 1979).
Nebraska's merger procedure is contained in NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2070 (1977).
The various state statutes governing merger uniformly provide that the surviving corporation is liable for all liabilities and obligations of the merged corporation. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2075(5) (Supp. 1982); MODEL
BusINEss CORP. ACT § 76(e) (rev. ed. 1979).
In a transaction involving a sale of corporate stock, the original corporate
entity continues to exist and therefore retains its liabilities. See Note, Assumption of ProductsLiability in CorporateAcquisitions, 55 B.U. L REv. 86,
93 (1975). Thus, there is no actual assumption of liabilities by the purchasing
corporation, but there is an economic assumption because the corporate entity is acquired intact. Freling, Tax Consequences of Nontax Motivated Aspects and Factors in the Sale of a CorporateBusiness, 21 INST. ON FED. TAX'N
1107, 1131 (1963).
9. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 411, 244 N.W.2d 873, 875
(1976). The general proposition that the surviving corporate party in a statutory merger transaction is liable for the torts of the dissolving corporation is
stated in 15 FLETCHER, supra note 7, at § 7121.
10. 15 FLETCHER, supra note 7, at § 7122. This creates a hardship for persons injured by defective products manufactured by the selling corporation. Most
asset acquisition contracts call for the voluntary dissolution of the selling corporation pursuant to the applicable state statute. See Note, Expanding the
Products Liability of Successor Corporations, 27 HATNGS 1J. 1305, 1309
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The rule of non-liability in the case of a purchase of a corporation's assets is essentially a corollary of the traditional rule of
property law which states that a bona fide purchaser of property
who gives adequate consideration and does not have notice of
prior claims is not liable when those claims subsequently become
known. 1 As long as the consideration received by the selling corporation for its assets is adequate, the traditional rule does not impair the rights of business creditors. 12 Since business creditors'
claims will be known, and will have accrued as of the time of dissolution, they can seek satisfaction of those claims from the proceeds
of the sale prior to distribution to the shareholders. However,
since many product liability claims arise years after the original
manufacturer of the product has dissolved, product liability plaintiffs are often precluded from asserting their claims against the
manufacturer. 13 Hence, although the traditional corporate rule
seems adequate in the area of creditor protection, it often works an
extreme hardship on the product liability plaintiff.
The rule of non-liability in the case of an assets acquisition is
subject to four generally recognized exceptions. As stated by the
Nebraska Supreme Court, liability may be imposed on the
purchasing corporation
(1)

[w] hen the purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agreed to

(1976). See also Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977); Leannais v.
Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 76
Ill. App. 3d 253, 395 N.E.2d 19 (1979); Johnson v. Marshall & Huschart Mach.
Co., 66 Ill. App. 3d 766, 384 N.E.2d 141 (1978). Most state dissolution statutes
provide that the dissolving corporation remain in existence, usually for two to
three years, solely for the purpose of being sued. See generally MODEL BusiNESS CORP. AcT § 105 (rev. ed. 1979) (two-year survival of claims). The Nebraska statute providing for survival of remedies upon dissolution, NEB. REV.
STAT. § 21-20,104 (1977), is nearly identical to the Model Act. Other state statutes are collected in MODEL BusmEss CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 105 (Supp. 1977).
The Model Act, which has been adopted in approximately one-half of the
states, provides for assertion of only those claims which accrue prior to the
filing of the Statement of Intent to Dissolve. Thus, in those states which have
adopted the Model Act, a products liability plaintiff injured subsequent to the
sale of assets would not be able to assert his claim against the manufacturing
corporation. Since many injuries caused by defective products occur years
after the manufacture of those products, the plaintiff may be precluded from
asserting his claim against the manufacturer even in states which allow suit
to be brought on claims arising during the winding-up period.
For a detailed discussion of the impact of corporate dissolution on products liability plaintiffs, see Henn & Alexander, Effect of CorporateDissolution
on ProductsLiability Claims, 56 CORNELL L REv. 865 (1971).
11. Note, supra note 8, at 93. For a discussion of the bona fide purchaser rule
with regard to real property transactions, see C. SMrH & R BOYER, SURVEY
OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 479-82 (1971).
12. Note, supra note 8, at 93-94.
13. See supra note 10.
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assume the selling corporation's liability; (2) [w]hen the transaction
amounts to a consolidation or merger of the purchaser and seller corporations; (3) [w]hen the purchaser corporation is merely a continuation of
the seller corporation; or (4) [w]hen the transaction
is entered into fraud14
ulently to escape liability for such obligations.

The first exception, express or implied assumption of the selling corporation's liabilities, is fairly straightforward. The purchasing corporation will normally assume certain liabilities necessary
to the uninterrupted conduct of the business. For example, existing contracts of the selling corporation are often expressly assumed.' 5 Unwanted or contingent liabilities, such as liability for
defectively manufactured products, are often avoided through a
clause in the sales contract expressly denying responsibility for all
liabilities not expressly assumed in the contract.I6 Because of the
acquiring corporation's ability to assume only the liabilities advantageous to the uninterrupted continuation of the business, the express or implied assumption exception is ordinarily of little help to
persons injured by defective products seeking compensation from
the successor corporation.
Likewise, the fraud exception ordinarily does little to ease the
product liability plaintiffs plight. The fraud exception has been
used to impose liability on a successor corporation where the consideration given for the assets was fictitious or inadequate.17 Also,
where the transfer was effected for the purpose of cheating creditors, the transferee has been held liable for the debts of the transferor.' 8 While this exception may be of some use in exceptional
14. Jones v. Johnson Mach. and Press Co., 211 Neb. 724, 728, 320 N.W.2d 481, 483
(1982). See also 15 FLETCHER, supra note 7, at § 7122 nn.6-11.
15. See, e.g., Bonee v. L & M Constr. Chem., 518 F. Supp. 375, 378 (M.D. Tenn.
1981) (buyer assumed seller's trade liabilities but did not assume future tort
liability). See also Note, supra note 10, at 1311.
16. See, e.g., Cyr v. B. Offen Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1151 (1st Cir. 1974); Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 412, 244 N.W.2d 873, 875 (1976). Amsted
Industries, Inc., the successor corporation in Jones, likewise assumed certain
liabilities essential to the continued operation of the business, while expressly disclaiming all other liabilities. Jones, 211 Neb. at 726, 320 N.W.2d at
482. But see Bouton v. Litton Industries, Inc., 423 F.2d 643, 652 (3d Cir. 1970),
where a broad assumption of liabilities clause was construed to impliedly include assumption of the risk of products liability claims.
17. 15 FLETCHER, supra note 7, at § 7125. See, e.g., Economy Ref. & Serv. Co. v.
Royal Nat'l Bank, 20 Cal. App. 3d 434, 97 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1971) (transfer not
supported by consideration found to be fraud upon creditor despite trial
court finding lack of fraudulent intent); Ingram v. Prairie Block Coal Co., 319
Mo. 644, 5 S.W.2d 413 (1928) (liability imposed on successor upon finding that
stated consideration of $125,000 was never paid).
18. United States v. Plastic Electro-Finishing Corp., 313 F. Supp. 330 (1970) (tax
deficiency; creditor was the United States government). See also 1 G. GLENN,
FRAUDuLENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 324 (rev. ed. 1940).
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cases, presumably, most assets sales are not entered into
fraudulently.
The exceptions most frequently used by plaintiffs to attempt to
impose liability for defective products upon a successor corporation in an assets acquisition transaction are the mere continuation
and de facto merger exceptions. Some courts have expanded
these exceptions in providing relief to persons injured by defective
products who have been deprived of a remedy due to the dissolution of the original manufacturing entity. The treatment of these
two exceptions is often similar, thus, the distinction between them
is difficult to perceive.
B.

Expansion of the De Facto Merger Doctrine

The de facto merger exception was used originally in the area of
shareholder voting and appraisal rights.19 If a corporate transaction is a statutory merger, a majority of the shareholders of both of
the involved corporations must approve the plan.2 0 If a transaction
is considered a sale of corporate assets, only a majority of the
shareholders of the transferor corporation need approve the sale.X1
Similarly, in the case of a statutory merger, the dissenting shareholders of both corporations may exercise appraisal rights, while
in the case of an assets acquisition, only the dissenting shareholders of the transferor corporation may exercise appraisal rights.22
The de facto merger exception, as originally formulated, was intended to protect the interests of shareholders23 in corporate com19. Ramirez v. Amsted Industries Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 341-42, 431 A.2d 811, 816 (1981).
See Note, ProductsLiability: Developments in the Rule of Successor Liability
for Product-RelatedInjuries, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 338, 352 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as ProductsLiability].
20. See, e.g., MODEL BusInEss CORP. AcT § 73 (rev. ed. 1979). Variations of this
provision are collected in MODEL BusINEss CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 73, 6 (Supp.
1977). Nebraska requires the approval of two-thirds of the shareholders of
each corporation. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2072 (1977).
21. See, e.g., MODEL BusiNEss CORP. ACT §§ 78-79 (rev. ed. 1979). Individual state
variations of this provision are collected in MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT ANN.
2D § 78, 66, § 79, 1 6 (Supp. 1977). Nebraska requires the approval of twothirds of the shareholders of the selling corporation if the sale does not take
place in the regular course of business. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2078 (1977).
22. See, e.g., MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT §§ 80-81 (rev. ed. 1979). Individual state
statutes are collected in MODEL BusINEss CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 80, 6, § 81, T 6
(1977 Supp.). Despite some procedural differences, Nebraska's approach to
the shareholders' right to dissent operates in essentially the same manner as
that of the Model Act. See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 21-2005, -2079 to -2080 ( 1977).
23. Some older cases mentioned the de facto merger doctrine in connection with
creditors' rights as opposed to stockholders' rights. The discussions in these
cases are generally confusing. See, e.g., City of Altoona v. Richardson Gas &
Oil Co., 81 Kan. 717, 106 P. 1025 (1910) (imposing liability for gas contracts on
the successor in a sale of assets for stock transaction where the transferor
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binations which, though in form are sales of assets, are in
24
substance mergers.
Only recently have courts begun to delineate factors germane
to a finding of a de facto merger in suits seeking to impose product
liability on the successor corporation. In statutory mergers, one
corporation absorbs another, and the shareholders of the dissolving corporation receive shares in the surviving corporation in exchange for the shares they previously owned.2 5 Thus, the essential
characteristics of a de facto merger have become continuity of
shareholder interest between the selling corporation and the buying corporation, and prompt dissolution of the selling
26
corporation.
The requirement that the selling corporation dissolve promptly
becomes practically extinct, despite the fact that the transferor continued to
exist and was available for suit); Pankey v. Hot Springs Nat'l Bank, 46 N.M.
10, 119 P.2d 636 (1941) (No defacto merger was found because the transaction
in question was not accomplished in accordance with the federal statutes
governing consolidation of national banks. Had the transfer been in accordance with the national bank consolidation statutes, it would have constituted
a statutory merger, and there would have been no reason to inquire into
whether the transaction amounted to a de facto merger.).
24. See Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958) (the leading
case), in which the court stated that mere reading of the provisions of the
sale agreement is insufficient. Rather, to determine whether the transaction
is a de facto merger, the consequences of the transaction should be scrutinized. Id. at 432, 143 A.2d at 28. See also Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257 Iowa
1277, 136 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 60 N.J.
Super. 333, 159 A.2d 146 (Ch. Div. 1960); but see Hariton v. Arco Elec., Inc., 41
Del. Ch. 74, 188 A.2d 123 (1963) (rejected the de facto merger doctrine on the
basis of the Delaware corporations statutes).
25. See supra note 8.
26. See, e.g., Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250, 1252 (E.D. Wisc. 1973)
(applying Wisconsin law) (cash consideration; seller continued to exist for
ten months after sale); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D.
Colo. 1968) (applying California law) (no de facto merger where the sale of
assets was for cash, and the seller continued to exist eleven months after the
sale). The court in Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D.
Mich. 1974) (applying New Jersey law), summarized the characteristics of a
de facto merger as found in the leading New Jersey case, McKee v. Harris
Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Law Div. 1970), affd, 118 N.J.
Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972), rev'd, 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981):
(1) There is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation, so that there is a continuity of management, personnel, physical
location, assets, and general business operations.
(2) There is a continuity of shareholders which results from the
purchasing corporation paying for the acquired assets with shares of
its own stock, this stock ultimately coming to be held by the shareholders of the seller corporation so that they become a constituent
part of the purchasing corporation.
(3) The seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operations,
liquidates, and dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible.
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes those liabilities and obli-
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upon the transfer of its assets was disregarded in Knapp v. North
American Rockwell Corp.,27 thereby expanding the scope of the de
facto merger exception. In Knapp, an employee of Mrs. Smith's
Pie Company was injured when his hand was caught in a Packomatic machine manufactured by Textile Machine Works (TMW).28
TMW had entered into an agreement with Rockwell under which it
had transferred substantially all of its assets to Rockwell in exchange for Rockwell stock, and had agreed to dissolve as soon as
the Rockwell stock had been distributed to its shareholders.29
However, TMW remained in existence for a full eighteen months
after its assets were transferred to Rockwell. 30
After noting that no prior cases decided under Pennsylvania
law had addressed the problem, and after a discussion of cases
from other jurisdictions which had failed to find a de facto merger
because of the continued existence of the selling corporation, the
court stated that "questions of an injured party's right to seek recovery are to be resolved by an analysis of public policy considerations rather than by a mere procrustean application of formalities
.... "31 The court observed that if Rockwell was not held liable,
Knapp would be left without a remedy,3 2 and that although neither
Knapp nor Rockwell were in a position to avoid the accident,
Rockwell was in a better position to spread the burden of the loss,
either through insurance or an adjustment in the price of its products. 33 Thus, although TMW continued to exist for a substantial
period of time following the transfer of its assets to Rockwell, the
court found that the "better reasoned result would be to conclude
that, for the purposes of determining liability to tortiously injured
parties, the Rockwell-TMW transaction should be treated as a
merger ....
34
Although the Knapp decision relied on the traditional corporate rule and its exceptions, it represents a departure from the line
of cases which merely applied the rule to the transaction in order
to determine liability. By analyzing the rule in terms of the policies underlying strict products liability, the Third Circuit Court of
gations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of normal business operations of the seller corporation.
Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. at 801.
27. 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975) (applying Pennsylvania law).
28. Id. at 362.

29. Id. at 363.
30. Id.

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

369.
368.
369-70.
367.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:408

Appeals set the stage for a reevaluation of the law of successor corporation liability for defective products.
C.

Expansion of the Mere Continuation Exception

The requirements for finding that a purchasing corporation is a
mere continuation of its predecessor are not well defined. Some
courts have stated that a finding of mere continuation is not permissible unless there is continuity of officers, directors, management, shareholders, and business operations. 35 Second, these
courts generally require that the seller have dissolved as soon as
possible after the transfer. It also appears that a corporation
which finds its origination in a reincorporation of an existing entity, or in an amendment of an existing corporate charter, will be
liable as a mere continuation of the predecessor. 36 From these observations, it appears that, at least until recently, a corporation
must have been materially identical to its predecessor in order to
have been subjected to the liabilities of the predecessor under the
37
mere continuation exception.
Like the de facto merger doctrine, the mere continuation exception has undergone considerable expansion. In Cyr v. B. Offen &
Co. 38 the plaintiff was severely burned while cleaning the rollers of
a printing press from inside a drying oven. The defective press and
oven were manufactured by B. Offen Company, a sole proprietorship owned by Bernard Offen. 39 Upon Offen's death, the employees of the company, together with an outside financier, purchased
the entire company from the estate.40 Applying New Hampshire
35. Lopata v. Bemis Co., 383 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (applying Pennsylvania
law); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D. Colo. 1968) (applying California law); McKee v. Harris Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 570, 264
A.2d 89, 107 (Law Div. 1970), affid 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div.
1972), rev'd, 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981).
36. See Comstock v. Great Lakes Distrib. Co., 209 Kan. 306, 312, 496 P.2d 1308, 1312
(1972).
37. For a general discussion of the mere continuation exception and a collection
of cases dealing with it, see 15 FLETCHER, supra note 7, at § 7329.
38. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
39. Id. at 1151.
40. Id. The court found important the fact that the purchase agreement obligated the newly formed corporation to: "(i) cause the Offen business to be
operated continuously. . . (ii) cause the Offen business to be operated substantially in accordance with the same business practices and policies as are
being employed by Offen at the date of agreement." Id. The court also noted
that the purchase of goodwill and contract obligations was central to the
agreement, that the newly formed purchaser assumed old service obligations,
that no notice of the purchase was given to known customers, that the same
products continued to be manufactured in the same way, and that B. Offen &
Company, the purchaser, claimed in its advertising that it was a 40-year-old
business. Id.
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law, which had not previously dealt with successor corporation liability for the defective products of the predecessor, the court held
that the successor could be held liable as a mere continuation of
the seller despite the fact that there was no continuity of
4
ownership. 1
After stating that the traditional corporate rule and its exceptions were designed to control business debts and liabilities rather
than the tort liability of manufacturers for defective products, the
court went on to analyze the situation in the framework of the policies underlying strict tort liability. The court stated:
The very existence of strict liability for manufacturers implies a basic
judgment that the hazards of predicting and insuring for risk from defective products are better borne by the manufacturer than by the consumer.
The manufacturer's successor, carrying over the experience and expertise
of the manufacturer, is likewise in a better position than the consumer to
gauge the risks and the costs of meeting them. The successor knows the
product, is as able to calculate the risk of defects as the predecessor, is in
position to insure therefor and reflect such cost in sale negotiations, and is
the only entity capable of improving the quality of the product. 4 2

The court concluded that the evidence of continuity provided by
the purchase contract and B. Offen & Company's outward representations to its customers, coupled with the underlying policy rationale of strict liability, mandated a finding that B. Offen &
Company was merely a continuation of its predecessor and should
be held liable for its predecessor's defective products.
D.

Turner and Ray: Abandonment of the Traditional Rule for Products
Liability Claimants

Although the courts in Knapp and Cyr employed strict liability
policy analyses in deciding to impose liability on successor corporations for the defective products of their predecessors, they did so
within the framework of the traditional exceptions to the corporate
rule of non-liability. Recently, two state courts have held that the
rights of plaintiffs in product liability suits involving successor corporations should be determined by reference to the policies under41. Id. at 1154. The Cyr court cited cases holding that commonality of ownership
is essential to a 'finding of continuation, (citing Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co.,
288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968); Bergman & Lefkow Ins. Agency & Co.v. Flash
Cab Co., 110 flL. App. 2d 415,249 N.E.2d 729 (1969)), but stated that the ownership of the entity should not control where the same employees continue to
produce the same products in the same plant, with the same supervision. 501
F.2d at 1152-54.
42. Id. at 1154. The court also noted that although the successor is not the entity
which placed the product in the channels of commerce, thereby representing
its safety to the public, the successor was profiting by its predecessor's representations through the goodwill it purchased, and through its outward representations of continuity. Id. See supra note 40.
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lying strict liability without regard to the formalities of corporate
law. Although the reasoning of the two cases is different in some
substantial respects, the underlying assumption in both casesthat the rights of an injured party should not be governed by the
form of a transaction to which the party was not privy-represents
a departure from the method of analysis ordinarily applied by
courts in this area.
The first case to abrogate the traditional rule in the area of successor corporation liability for defective products was Turnerv. Bituminous Casualty C0.43 In Turner, both of the plaintiffs hands
were severed by a power press manufactured by the T.W. & C.B.
Sheridan Company (Old Sheridan). Four years prior to the injury,
Old Sheridan sold its entire business (including name, goodwill,
and assets) for cash to a wholly owned subsidiary of Harris-Intertype Corporation, which incorporated under the name of T.W. &
C.B. Sheridan Company (New Sheridan). Although New Sheridan
expressly assumed certain of Old Sheridan's liabilities, it did not
assume any liabilities not on the balance sheet of Old Sheridan as
of the selling date. New Sheridan later merged with its parent
company, Harris-Intertype Corporation. Turner appealed, following summary judgment for Harris in the initial trial.44
After noting that the traditional corporate rule of non-liability
and its exceptions arose in the areas of creditor protection, tax assessments, and shareholder's rights, and, as such, are generally
unresponsive to the claims of products liability plaintiffs, the court
analyzed the significance of the characterization of the corporate
transaction from the standpoints of the injured party and the corporate transferee. 45 The court stated that "[t] o the injured person
the problem of recovery is substantially the same, no matter what
corporate process led to transfer of the first corporation and/or its
assets."46 Second, the court found the characterization of the
transaction irrelevant to the corporate transferee, as long as both
the seller and the buyer can determine exactly what is being transferred in order to establish an appropriate price. After observing
43. 397 Mich. 406,244 N.W.2d 873 (1976). There is apparently some confusion as to
whether the Turner court created a new exception to the traditional rule of
non-liability, or simply expanded the mere continuation exceptions. See infra note 51.
44. These facts are taken from the Michigan Supreme Court's opinion. 397 Mch.
at 411-13, 244 N.W.2d at 875-76.
45. Id. at 418-19, 244 N.W.2d at 878.
46. Id. at 419, 244 N.W.2d at 878. The court observed that regardless of whether
the transaction took the form of a traditional statutory merger, a de facto
merger in which one corporation paid for the assets of another with its own
stock, or a sale of assets for cash, the injured party had no place to seek relief
other than the transferee corporation.
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that there would be no question of Harris' liability under the de
facto merger exception had the consideration for the SheridanHarris transaction been stock rather than cash, the court stated
that it could discern no logical reason to treat the two types of
transactions differently. 47
Following a discussion of two cases which had imposed liability
on successor corporations on the basis of continuity between the
transferor and transferee entities,48 the Turner court accepted the
defendant's assertion that business reality required New Sheridan
to be as much as possible like Old Sheridan in order to exploit the
goodwill purchased from Old Sheridan.49 The court, however,
found this to be a strong indication of continuity. Accordingly, continuity of the two business concerns was sufficient to impose liability for defective products on the successor. "Justice would be
offended if a corporation which holds itself out as a particular company for the purpose of sales, would not be estopped from denying
that it is that company for the purpose of determining products

liability."5 0

Turner premised successor liability for a defective product on
the enterprise continuity between transferor and transferee. A
second new exception 51 to the traditional rule of non-liability in a
47. Id. at 423, 244 N.W.2d at 880. The Turner court did not ignore the fact that a
major distinction between a sale of assets for stock and a sale of assets for
cash is that in the former, commonality of ownership is provided by the exchange of stock. It recognized that the presence of stock as consideration is
evidence of a sufficient nexus between the seller and buyer to impose liability. However, as the court observed, the consideration in a stock for assets
transaction is frequently a mixed bag of stock and cash, so that the actual
commonality of ownership is minimal. Thus, the absence of an exchange of
stock should not be conclusive. Id.
48. The Turner court discussed Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974),
and Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974). For
a discussion of Cyr, see supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text. The Shannon test for a de facto merger is quoted supra in note 26.
49. Turner, 397 Mich. at 426, 244 N.W.2d at 882.
50. Id. The court adopted the first, third, and fourth criteria from the test set out
out in Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974), as
guidelines to establish sufficient continuity to impose liability for the predecessor's defective products. Turner, 397 Mich. at 426, 244 N.W.2d at 882. See
supra note 26.
51. At least one court has characterized the Turner approach as simply an expansion of the mere continuation exception. Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc.,
86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981). This reading of Turner seems too narrow.
Although the Turner court adopted parts of the traditional test for a de facto
merger as guidelines in establishing continuity of interest, see supra note 50,
the court also recognized that a satisfactory result can only be reached when
the problem is correctly treated as a products liability case and is decided on
products liability principles rather than simply reexamining and readjusting
corporate law principles. Turner, 347 Mich. at 423, 244 N.W.2d at 880. Addi-
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sale of assets transaction has developed in the Supreme Court of
California. The exception created in Ray v. Alad Corp.,52 however,
is based on continuation of the product line rather than enterprise
continuity.
In Ray, the plaintiff was injured when he fell from a defective
ladder manufactured by the Alad Corporation (Alad I). Approximately nine months prior to the injury, Alad I had sold its entire
business, including stock in trade, trade names, and goodwill, to
Lighting Maintenance Corporation for cash. As was contemplated
by the sale contract, Alad I promptly dissolved following completion of the sale. Lighting Maintenance Corporation then reincorporated as Alad Corporation (Alad II). Alad IIassumed certain of
Alad I's liabilities and promised to fill its uncompleted orders, but
no mention was made in the sales contract of liability for defectively manufactured products. Following the purchase by Alad II,
the same product lines were manufactured in the same plant, by
the same people, according to the same plans. Additionally, the
Alad name was used on all ladders manufactured by the new company. With the exception of redesigning the logo, Alad H gave no
outward indication of the change of ownership.5 3
The action in Ray had been dismissed by the trial court on defendant's motion for summary judgment based on the traditional
rule of non-liability in asset sales transactions. The court of appeals reversed the trial court due to the continuity between Alad I
and Alad 11,54 a rationale very similar to the approach taken in Turner.55 The California Supreme Court, however, declined to follow
the opinion of the court of appeals. Concluding that liability could
not be imposed on Alad H under the exceptions to the traditional
rule applied by the trial court,5 6 and declining to expand those exceptions,5 7 the Court created an additional exception to the tradi58
tional rule for cases involving product liability claims.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

58.

tionally, the holding in Turner was at least partially based on an estoppel
theory. See mupra text accompanying note 50. Thus, although the court in
Turner spoke in terms of continuation and continuity of interest, the opinion
still
represents a significant departure from the continuation exception, even
as expanded by Cyr.
19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
Id. at 28, 560 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
Ray v. Alad Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 855, 127 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1976).
See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 CaL 3d 22, 28, 560 P.2d 3, 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 578 (1977).
Id. at 30, 560 P.2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579. Although referring to Cyr, see
supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text, as helpful authority, the Ray court
disagreed with the approach taken in Cyr, whereby a generally recognized
exception to the general rule of non-liability was expanded in order to accommodate the interests of product liability plaintiffs.
19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 582. The court held: "[A] party
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Following a discussion of California strict liability cases and

policies, 59 the court advanced the following justifications for im-

posing strict liability upon a manufacturer's successor.
(1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiffs remedies against the original
manufacturer caused by the successor's acquisition of the business, (2)
the successor's ability to assume the original manufacturer's risk-spreading rule, and (3) the fairness of requiring the successor to assume a responsibility for defective products that was a burden necessarily attached
to the original manufacturer's good will being
enjoyed by the successor in
60
the continued operation of the business.

Applying these policies, the Ray court found that the plaintiffs
remedies against Alad I were destroyed by its dissolution. Additionally, the court found that Alad 17 was as able to insure against
the risks of defective products and spread that cost throughout society by adjustments in the price of its products, as Alad I. Finally,

the court found it fair to impose liability on Alad II because of its
"deliberate albeit legitimate exploitation of Alad I's established

reputation as a going concern manufacturing a specific product
line ....
,61 Imposition of liability on successor manufacturers
was found to have the salutary effect of avoiding windfalls to the
predecessor through enhanced purchase prices not reflecting the

costs of liability for defective products.62

That there is no uniformly agreed upon approach to the prob-

lem of successor liability for defectively manufactured products is
demonstrated by the previous discussion. Clearly, courts have

been struggling to articulate an approach which balances the policies of strict products liability theory with the traditional law of
corporations. Prior to 1974, every successor product liability problem was analyzed according to the traditional rule of non-liability
and its generally recognized exceptions. Although analysis under

the traditional rule continues, 63 a number of courts have attempted

59.

60.
61.
62.
63.

which acquires a manufacturing business and continues the output of its line
of products under the circumstances here presented assumes strict tort liability for defects in units of the product line previously manufactured and
distributed by the entity from which the business was acquired." Id. Thus,
contrary to the approaches taken by the Turner court and the court of appeals in Ray, liability under the new exception is premised on continuity of
the product line rather than continuity of the entire enterprise.
The court discussed Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d
436 (1944); Greenan v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, (1963); and Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d
145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). These cases are fairly characterized as the seminal cases in the area of strict tort liability theory.
Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
Id.
See, e.g., Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977); Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 76 Ill.
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to lessen the burden of persons injured by the defective product of
a defunct manufacturer. This has been accomplished through
traditional exceptions,64 or creation of eneither expansion of the
65
tirely new exceptions.
III. APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS: DECISIONS DEALING
WITH PRODUCTS LIABILITY ENGENDERED BY
THE JOHNSON MACHINE AND PRESS
CORPORATE HISTORY
A.

Cases Decided Prior to Jones

With the background painted, this Note will now analyze the
competing concerns of these varied approaches to solving the successor liability problem within the confines of a given fact situation. The same corporate transaction involved in Jones has been
analyzed by a number of different courts. Noticeably, the legal
principles applied and the conclusions reached have been anything but consistent. However, with some slight exceptions, e.g.,
time of purchase of the press, press model, etc., the cases involving
the Johnson-Bontrager-Amsted assets sale presented identical
fact situations.
Johnson Machine and Press Company was a manufacturing
concern engaged in the production of power presses. 66 In 1956, all
assets and liabilities of Johnson were transferred to the Bontrager
Corporation in exchange for Bontrager common stock. Johnson
became a wholly owned subsidiary of Bontrager, but engaged in no
corporate activities, and owned no assets other than trade names.
Bontrager continued to manufacture presses under the Johnson
trade name until August 31, 1962.
On August 20, 1962, Amsted Industries purchased all of BonApp. 3d 253, 395 N.E.2d 19 (1979). See also the discussions of Hernandez v.
Johnson Press Corp., 70 Ill. App. 3d 664, 388 N.E.2d 778 (1979), infra notes 8086 and accompanying text; and Jones v. Johnson Mach. and Press Co., 211
Neb. 724, 320 N.W.2d 481 (1982), infra notes 99-120 and accompanying text.
64. See Knapp v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), supra notes
27-34 and accompanying text; and Cyr v. B. Offen and Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st
Cir. 1974), supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
65. See the discussions of Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244
N.W.2d 873 (1976), supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text; and Ray v. Alad
Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977), supra notes 52-62 and
accompanying text.
66. The facts presented here are taken from Jones v. Johnson Mach. and Press
Co., 211 Neb. 724, 320 N.W.2d 481 (1982). The same set of facts will be used in
the analysis of all of the cases involving this corporate transaction. Notation
will be made, however, where the findings of fact of the various courts conflict
with the facts as stated by the Nebraska Supreme Court.
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trager's assets for cash. The sole remaining share of Johnson stock
was included in this transfer. In the sale contract between Amsted
and Bontrager, Amsted had agreed to assume certain liabilities of
Bontrager, but these did not include liability for defective products
manufactured by Johnson or Bontrager. Indeed, the contract provided that all machines manufactured prior to the sale were the
sole responsibility of Bontrager. Bontrager and its shareholders
also agreed not to compete with Amsted for five years. Two days
after the purchase of Bontrager, Amsted assigned all its rights
under the contract to its wholly owned subsidiary, South Bend
Lathe, Incorporated. South Bend Lathe began to manufacture
presses at the original plant, under the Johnson trade name, in
September of 1962.
Bontrager was dissolved and its remaining assets distributed to
its shareholders in 1964. Approximately one year later, Amsted
dissolved Johnson, and as its sole shareholder received its assets,
which consisted solely of trade names. In 1965, South Bend Lathe
was also dissolved by Amsted. However, with the exception of a
change of plants, South Bend Lathe continued to use the same
equipment to manufacture presses under the Johnson trademark,
as an unincorporated division of Amsted. In 1975, Amsted sold its
South Bend Lathe division to LWE, Incorporated, which then reincorporated as South Bend Lathe, Incorporated, and continued to
67
manufacture Johnson presses.
The first reported decision 6 8 dealing with the Johnson-Bon67. In Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981), the
court found that the sale contract between Amsted and South Bend contained an indemnification agreement whereby Amsted agreed to indemnify
South Bend for any losses arising out of machinery manufactured and sold
prior to the closing date. Amsted thus acknowledged that it would be responsible for defending suits and for any liability arising out of defects in the
Johnson product lines. Id. at 340, 431 A.2d at 815. The Nebraska Supreme
Court did not mention an indemnification agreement in its opinion. The appellant's brief submitted to the Nebraska Supreme Court asserted that South
Bend Lathe, by letter to appellant's counsel, stated that when Amsted sold
South Bend Lathe, Amsted agreed to assume responsibility for liabilities
prior to the date of sale in June of 1975. Brief for the Appellant at 12, Jones,
211 Neb. 724, 320 N.W.2d 481 (1982). Additionally, while the appellee's brief
requested the Nebraska Supreme Court to affirm the summary judgments as
to both Amsted and South Bend Lathe, their briefed arguments were directed almost solely towards Amsted's potential liability. It remains unclear
why no mention of the indemnification agreement was made. Because the
Nebraska Supreme Court affhmed the summary judgments in favor of both
Amsted and South Bend Lathe, it is not clear whether one of the parties or
both of them would have been liable had the case been decided differently.
68. One unreported case involving the Johnson-Bontrager-Amsted transactions
has been found. In Poole v. Amstead [sic) Indus., Inc., No. CIV-1-76-75 (E.D.
Tenn. 1976), affd, 575 F.2d 1338 (1978), the district court granted Amsted's
motion for summary judgment. On appeal, in an unreported per curiam opin-
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trager-Amsted transfers and their effect on liability for defective
products was Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe.69 In Ortiz, the allegedly
defective press had been manufactured by Johnson and sold
through Johnson's distributor, Meyer Sheet Metal Machinery
Company, to the plaintiff's employer in 1955. Applying the traditional rule of non-liability in a cash-for-assets transaction, the Ortiz court held that liability could not be imposed on Amsted for
70
products defectively manufactured by its predecessors.
The Ortiz opinion was accompanied by a forceful dissent by
Justice Fleming.71 Conceding that several corporate transfers had
occurred between the time of the manufacture of the press and the
injury, he noted that an outward showing of business continuity
had been maintained throughout the transfers. He found this continuity to be sufficient to place liability for Johnson's defectively
7
manufactured products on Amsted. 2
The next case involving Amsted's liability for presses defectively manufactured by Johnson was Korzetz v. Amsted Industries,
Inc. 73 Applying Michigan law, 74 the court analyzed the Amsted

69.
70.

71.
72.

73.
74.

ion, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. However, the court noted that
the plaintiff had failed to allege that the original manufacturer (Bontrager)
had dissolved, or that it was without sufficient assets to satisfy claims. Because of the apparent inadequacy of the plaintiff's pleading, the case was not
presented to the 6th Circuit in an acceptable posture, and it will not be further discussed here.
46 Cal. App. 3d 842,120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975). Ortiz was expressly overruled by
Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 34, 560 P.2d 3, 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 582 (1977).
See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
Under California law the plaintiff was allowed to recover from Johnson's distributor, Meyer. The Ortiz court was thus faced with the claim of a member
of the original chain of distribution for indemnification by the successor to
the original manufacturer. For general discussions of the imposition of strict
products liability on members of the chain of distribution, see Carmichael,
Strict Liability in Tort-An Explosion in Products Liability Law, 20 DRAKE
L. REV. 528, 556-62 (1971); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 50 MiNN. L. REV. 791, 814-15 (1966).
Because of a Nebraska statute allowing product liability suits to be
brought only against the manufacturer, the plaintiff in Ortiz would have been
left with no remedy at all under the traditional rule of non-liability in Nebraska. See infra text accompanying note 114.
Ortiz, 46 Cal. App. 3d at 850, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
In an oft-quoted passage, Justice Fleming colorfully outlined his position:
Product liability today has become an integral part of a manufacturing business, and the liability attaches to the business like fleas to a
dog, where it remains imbedded regardless of changes in ownership
of the business. So long as the business retains its distinctive identity and character and continues to be operated as it has in the past,
defective product liability adheres to the business and remains there
until discharged by bankruptcy or comparable judicial act.
Id. at 851, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 561 (dissenting opinion).
472 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
Id. at 143.
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corporate history and its effect on liability for Johnson's defectively manufactured presses under the approach espoused in Turner.7 5 Applying the guidelines for determining continuity of
76
the court found "strong and convincing
interest set out in Turner,
7
evidence" of continuity.7
Amsted asserted that the change in corporate name, and the
fact that the intermediate purchase by Bontrager, in effect, twice
removed Amsted from the original manufacturer, rebutted the evidence of enterprise continuity found by the court. Additionally,
Amsted asserted that Bontrager's continued existence for over two
years following the sale of its assets to Amsted precluded the imposition of liability on Amsted. The court, however, disagreed. It
noted that Turner required only that the transferor eventually become defunct, -a condition present in the instant case despite the
fact of Bontrager's continued existence. The intermediate ownership by Bontrager was found to be legally insignificant because,
despite that ownership, Amsted continued the business that Johnson established.78 Finally, the court found that the change in corporate name, in reality, did little to rebut the previous finding of
continuity of interest.7 9 The court thus found that under the Turner rule of enterprise liability, Amsted could be held liable for the
defectively manufactured products of its predecessors.
The reasoning most closely resembling that adopted by the Nebraska Supreme Court was set out in Hernandezv. Johnson Press
Corp.80 Applying the general corporate rule of non-liability in
cash-for-assets acquisitions, the Appellate Court of Illinois held
that Amsted was not liable for injuries caused by the defective
products of its predecessors. The court found that under the generally recognized exceptions to the traditional rule, no de facto
merger had occurred. 81 Furthermore, on what has been character75. See the discussion of Turner, supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 26 & 50.
77. Korzetz, 472 F. Supp. at 144. This evidence included the following facts: Amsted purchased all of Bontrager's assets; sales representative contracts were
to be maintained; and the real property which was transferred was to be used
for continuing operations. Also, Bontrager's shareholders covenanted not to
compete with Amsted for five years, and Amsted was to attempt to employ all
of Bontrager's employees except three management level personnel.
78. Id. at 145.
79. "The Whole World' that actually or constructively searched the Indiana Secretary of State's Office may have been notified that the official corporate
names 'Johnson' or 'Bontrager' were not continued by Ansted, but the world
of the marketplace continued to see and rely upon the name 'Johnson
Press.'" Id. at 144.

80. 70 Mll.
App. 3d 664, 388 N.E.2d 778 (1979).
81. The de facto merger doctrine as traditionally formulated requires substantial
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ized as a shamefully weak record, 82 the court could point to no
facts indicating continuity of management, personnel, physical lo83
cation, assets and general business operations.
The court also refused to apply Ray's product line analysis to
the Amsted transaction. Referring to an earlier Illinois appellate
decision rejecting the Ray analysis,84 the Hernandez court found
certain factual distinctions significant.85 Additionally, the court asserted that the product line analysis was not appropriate because
"broad public policy issues are best handled by

legislatures.

86
...

The Ray approach rejected in Hernandez was adopted two
years later as the law of New Jersey in Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc.87 In Ramirez, the plaintiff was injured by a Johnson
press manufactured by Johnson in 1948 or 1949. The trial court had

82.
83.
84.
85.

86.

87.

identity of ownership between the transferor and transferee entities, i.e., the
purchase of assets with the acquiring corporation's stock as consideration.
See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text. Amsted, however, purchased
Bontrager's assets for cash.
Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 348, 431 A.2d 811, 819 (1981).
Hernandez, 70 Ill.
App. 3d at 667, 388 N.E.2d at 780. Compare this finding to
that of the Korzetz court, supra note 79.
Johnson v. Marshall & Huschart Mach. Co., 66 11. App. 3d 766, 384 N.E.2d 141
(1978).
In Ray, there were no intermediate transfers, the plaintiff was injured nine
months after the change of corporate ownership, and the transferor agreed to
consult with and not compete against the transferee. The Hernandez court
noted that Bontrager owned the Johnson business prior to Amsted, and that
the injury complained of occurred 19 years after the original sale of the defective press. Additionally, the court found no evidence in the record of consultation or non-competition agreements. Based on the findings of other courts,
these factual distinctions do not appear to be particularly compelling. See
the discussions of Korzetz, supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text and Ramirez, infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text. More importantly, perhaps,
since Ray is firmly grounded in the underlying policies of strict products liability, it would seem that a better approach in determining whether or not to
adopt that rationale would be to analyze those same policies rather than
merely distinguish the cases on factual grounds.
Hernandez, 70 Ill.
App. 3d at 670, 388 N.E.2d at 782 (quoting Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1977)). The Illinois Appellate Court
has recently reaffirmed its adherence to the traditional corporate rule and its
exceptions. In Manh Hung Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. and Press Co., 104 Ill
App. 3d 1141, 433 N.E.2d 1104 (1982), the court once again analyzed the Johnson corporate transactions with reference to the traditional rule, and found
that Amsted could not be held liable under any of the exceptions. Noting that
plaintiffi's claim against the original manufacturer was destroyed by virtue of
the corporate dissolution statute, the court suggested that the best solution to
the problem would be to require dissolving corporations to maintain products
liability insurance or to keep enough assets on hand to satisfy claims arising
subsequent to dissolution. This solution, said the court, must be sought in
the legislature rather than the courts.
86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981).
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granted Amsted's motion for summary judgment on the basis of
the traditional rule, but was reversed by the appellate division in
an opinion essentially adopting the product line exception. 88 On
appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the plaintiff argued that
Amsted could be held liable under the expanded mere continuation exception, 89 the continuity of enterprise approach, 9 0 or the
product line exception.9 ' Following a discussion of the various approaches and their underlying rationales, the court concluded that
the best reasoned mode of analysis was the product line
92
exception.
Applying the Ray (product line) analysis to the Johnson-Bontrager-Amsted transactions, the court held that Amsted should be
liable for its predecessor's defectively manufactured products. Despite Bontrager's briefly continued corporate existence following
its sale of assets to Amsted, the court noted that the plaintiff's remedy was destroyed by the transactions, while the Johnson product
line continued to be produced. Second, Amsted was better able to
spread the cost of injuries through insurance than was the injured
party. Finally, because Amsted enjoyed the use of Johnson's trade
name and goodwill, and because it was able to purchase the assets
of an established manufacturing enterprise, imposition of liability
for Johnson's defectively manufactured presses seemed justified.93
88. Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 171 N.J. Super. 261, 408 A-2d 818 (App. Div.
1979).
89. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
92. The court found the traditional rule, even as expanded by Cyr, to be "inconsistent with the developing principles of strict products liability and unresponsive to the interests of persons injured by defective products in the
stream of commerce." Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 342,431 A.2d at 816. Characterizing
Turner as simply an expansion of the mere continuation exception, see upra
note 51, the court noted the fundamental differences between the Turner and
Ray approaches. While the Turner analysis hinges on continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, trade names, and general business
operations, the Ray test looks past the composition of the corporate identity
and focuses instead on "the successor's undertaking to manufacture essentially the same line of products as the predecessor." Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 347,
431 A.2d at 819. The court felt that in cases involving successor liability for
defective products, the continued manufacturing operations should be emphasized rather than the commonality of ownership and management. Id.
93. 86 N.J. at 352-53, 431 A.2d at 822. The court stated:
Through acquisition of the Johnson tradename, plant, employees,
manufacturing equipment, designs and customer lists, and by holding itself out to potential customers as the manufacturer of the same
line of Johnson power presses, Amsted benefited substantially from
the legitimate exploitation of the accumulated good will earned by
the Johnson product line. Public policy requires that having received the substantial benefits of the continuing manufacturing enterprise, the successor corporation should also be made to bear the
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Although some courts have downplayed arguments that imposition of liability for defective products in asset sales for cash will
have a chilling effect on future transfers,94 the Ramirez court acknowledged that abandonment of the traditional rule of non-liability may have some detrimental effect on the marketability of going
business concerns. It found, however, that a reduction in the sale
price of a business to reflect potential liability for previously defectively manufactured products is, "a more ... accurate measure of
the true worth of the business." 9 5 In addition to adjustments in the
purchase price of a business, the acquiring entity may protect it-

self through purchase of products liability insurance, 9 6 full or partial indemnification agreements, or by requiring the seller to
maintain an escrow account out of which product liability claims
can be paid.97 Thus, although the problems caused to business
planners by abandonment of the old non-liability rule should not
be ignored, the Ramirez court found that the social policy favoring
imposition of the costs of injuries on the manufacturing enterprise
outweighed the potential negative impact on the business
community. 98

94.
95.
96.

97.

98.

burden of the operating costs that other established businesses must
ordinarily bear.
Id. (citation omitted).
See Turner, 397 Mich. at 428, 244 N.W.2d at 883.
Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 354, 431 A.2d at 822.
Admittedly, products liability insurance is frequently expensive, and occasionally impossible to obtain. For example, there was testimony in 1977
before the House Committee on Small Businesses that 21.6% of businesses
seeking products liability insurance could not obtain it. Products Liability
Insurance: Survey Findings of the Subcomm. on Capital, Investment, and
Business Opportunities of the House Comm. on Small Business, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 13177 (1977) (statement of Charles Whalen). Nevertheless, products
liability insurance is available to most businesses, and the costs associated
with it may be passed along to society as a whole through a corresponding
increase in the price of the insured's business products. For a general discussion of the effects of insurance on the decision to impose products liability on
corporate successors, see Comment, ProductsLiability and Successor Corporations: Protectingthe Product User and the Small ManufacturerThrough IncreasedAvailability of ProductsLiability Insurance, 13 U.C.D. L Rav. 1000
(1980).
For an excellent discussion of precautions which can be taken by the acquiring entity in order to protect itself from the burden of unexpected liabilities
upon the acquisition of another business, see Kadens, Practitioner'sGuide to
Treatment of Seller's ProductsLiabilitiesin Assets Acquisitions, 10 U. TOL. L
Rav. 1 (1978). Professor Kadens takes a unique approach to the problem.
Rather than discuss the propriety of imposing liability on a corporate successor in a sale of assets transaction, he merely assumes that because of the
recent trend, a good chance of successor liability exists. He then outlines
methods which can be used to minimize or insure against that liability.
The court was further convinced that "[i]n time, the risk-spreading and cost
avoidance measures adverted to above should become a normal part of busi-
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B. The Fifth Decision: Jones v. Johnson Machine and Press Co.
Fully cognizant of the emerging conflict with regard to corporate successor liability, and against the background of Ortiz,
Korzetz, Hernandez, and Ramirez, the Nebraska Supreme Court
faced for the first time, in Jones, the question of whether a corporation acquiring the assets of another concern for cash can be held
liable for the defective products of the predecessor. The court
chose to answer that question in the negative. In reaching the decision, the court did not employ an ornate analysis. Rather, the
importance of the case to Nebraska practitioners lies not so much
in the holding of the case itself, but in what the opinion of the court
did not say.
Following a lengthy presentation of the corporate transactions
which led to Amsted's ownership of the Johnson press enterprise, 99 the court cited several cases imposing liability on successor corporations. 0 0 The court noted the basic theory relied upon
in each of those cases, but did not analyze any of them in depth.101
Recognizing that some courts had imposed liability on successor
corporations for the injuries caused by products defectively manufactured by their predecessors, the court nevertheless declared
that "under the facts in the present case we find no basic justifica0 2
tion for a departure from the traditional rules."
The court then stated that the policy considerations underlying
the usual application of strict liability "do not necessarily apply
equally to successor corporations."10 3 Unfortunately, the court
failed to articulate what it considers those policies to be, and why
they do not apply to corporate successor liability. It seems somewhat incongruous that courts imposing liability on successor corporations have premised their decisions squarely upon the
ness planning in connection with the corporate acquisition of the assets of a
manufacturing enterprise." Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 354-55, 431 A.2d at 823.
99. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.

100. The court cited the superior court opinion in Ramirez v. Amsted Industries,
Inc., 171 N.J. Super. 261, 408 A.2d 818 (App. Div. 1979); Shannon v. Samuel
Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406,244 N.W.2d 873 (1976), see supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text; and Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574
(1977), see supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text. The court also cited
Dawejko v. Jorgenson Steel Co., 290 Pa. Super. 15, 434 A.2d 106 (Super. Ct.
1981), a case in which the Superior Court of Pennsylvania adopted Ray's
product line exception. The reasoning of the Dawejko court is very similar to
that set forth in Ramirez, supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
101. The court's discussion of the cases cited in note 100, supra, took up slightly
less than one-half page of the opinion.
102. Jones v. Johnson Mach. and Press Co., 211 Neb. at 729, 320 N.W.2d at 484.
103. Id.
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underlying rationales of strict products liability, while the Nebraska court found that those policies do not apply to successors.
To date, the Nebraska court has failed to clearly articulate the
doctrinal rationale it embraces in strict liability cases. 1O4 The doctrine of strict liability for defective products was adopted as the
law of Nebraska in Kohler v. Ford Motor Co.105 In Kohler, however, the court did not discuss the rationale for adopting strict liability. Instead, it referred readers to a number of prior cases and
commentaries.10 6 Although the references cited by the court discuss the various policy justifications in various ways, comment c to
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Tortslo7 seems fairly
representative of the Nebraska Supreme Court's view of strict liability for defective products, at least until Jones.
But in Jones the court stated:
[T] he corporate assets purchaser, as a successor of the manufacturer of a
defective product, cannot be said to have created the risk of a product
manufactured by its predecessor, and, except in a very remote way, does
not realize the profit for the sale of a predecessor's product. Generally
speaking, the successor corporation has neither invited use of its predecessor's product nor represented to the public that that product is safe
and suitable for use. 1 08
104. An extensive discussion of past Nebraska products liability cases is beyond
the scope of this note. This conclusion, however, is supported by other writers. See, e.g., Comment, Strict Tort Liability in Nebraska: Recent Developments in Perspective, 12 CREIGHrON L. REv. 370 (1978); Note, FriedrichII:
Nebraska Takes a CloserLook at Automobile Design Defect, Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 204 Neb. 468, 283 N.W.2d 25 (1979), 59 NEB. L REV. 538, 540-41 (1980).
105. 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971).
106. The court in Kohler cited Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 50 Cal. 2d 57,
377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, (1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966). Additionally, the court alluded to Justice Traynor's
concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436
(1944).
107.
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been
said to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by it;
that the public has the right to and does expect, that in the case of
products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the
seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by
products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such
products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of
someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market
the products.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment C (1965).

108. Jones, 211 Neb. at 729-30, 320 N.W.2d at 484 (emphasis added).
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While it is true that the successor in Jones did not place the
defective product on the market, or realize a profit from the sale of
that particular item, other courts have characterized the benefit received by the successor in its purchase of the entire operation of
its predecessor in substantially stronger terms than remote, 09 and
a broader view of the benefits received by the successor is surely
consistent with the Restatement position. Indeed, the very reason
for purchasing the entire operation of another corporation rather
than just the physical facilities is to allow the successor to exploit
the accumulated goodwill and reputation of the predecessor."l 0 In
fact, failure to impose liability on the successor leads to a windfall
for both the predecessor and the successor. The seller receives an
enhanced price for its enterprise which does not reflect the costs to
society of the injuries caused by its defective products, and the
buyer receives the benefits of an established business concern
without inheriting the products liability which would normally be
attached to that enterprise."' Likewise, although the successor
has not invited the public to use a particular item manufactured by
its predecessor, the very fact that it continues the predecessor's
operations in substantially the same manner, including trade
names and product lines, shows that it is counting upon the public's reliance on the representations made by the predecessor."12
Similarly, other policy justifications delineated in section 402A
of the the Restatement1 3 also seem to encourage the imposition of
liability on the successor. The public policy requiring that the
costs of injuries be absorbed through insurance by those who market products applies with equal force to corporate successors. Although the successor did not place the defective item into the
stream of commerce, it is essentially the only entity able to minimize the social cost of injuries through insurance.
The final justification offered by the Restatement which supports the imposition of liability on successor corporations is that
the consumer is entitled to maximum protection from defective
products and the proper parties to provide that protection are
those marketing the products. Absent successor liability, the injured party will frequently go wholly uncompensated. More specifically, the Nebraska product liability plaintiff is precluded from
maintaining an action against members of the distributive chain
other than the manufacturer." 4 So notwithstanding the fact that
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See
See
See
See
See

supra note 42.
supra note 49 and accompanying text.
Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
supra text accompanying note 50.
supra note 107.

114. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,181 (1979) provides:
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injured parties can recover from the seller in most other states,1 1 5
this alternative is not available in Nebraska unless the defective
product was purchased directly from the manufacturer. Thus, it
does not seem harsh to force the successor to absorb costs for
which it would have been liable had the corporate transfer been
accomplished in any manner other than by sale of assets for cash.
The court in Jones also found that problems of altering or expanding the traditional rules of corporate law for tort liability were
accentuated by "the passage of time involved in the present case,
and the multiple corporate successors .
*.".."116
Conversely, the
courts in Korzetz" 7 and Ramirez 1 8 attached no legal significance
to the intermediate transfer to Bontrager. Moreover, it is difficult
to determine from the oblique language in the opinion what significance the Jones court found in these facts. Regardless of the intermediate transaction, the plaintiff remains without a remedy unless
the successor is held liable. Likewise, although Amsted purchased
assets belonging to Bontrager, the Johnson product line continued
its public existence in much the same form it had since the days
Johnson presses were manufactured by the original Johnson
Machine and Press Company.1 9 Furthermore, because of a re-

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

No product liability action based on the doctrine of strict liability in
tort shall be commenced or maintained against any seller or lessor of
a product which is alleged to contain or possess a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the buyer, user, or consumer unless the
seller or lessor is also the manufacturer of the product or the part
thereof claimed to be defective.
See supra note 70.
Jones, 211 Neb. at 730, 320 N.W.2d at 484.
See supra text accompanying note 78.
Ramirez, 86 NJ. at 350, 431 A.2d at 820.
Because the district court granted summary judgment to both Amsted and
South Bend Lathe, and because no mention of an indemnity agreement between the two is made in the supreme court's opinion, it is possible that the
"multiple corporate successors" language referred to the Amsted/South
Bend transaction rather than the Bontrager/Amsted transaction. See supra
note 67. Since both of these corporations remain viable economic entities, if
the court had not disposed of the case under the traditional corporate law
rule, the issue of successor corporate liability when more than one viable corporation exists could have been addressed.
Two opinions based on the Turner rationale address successor liability
where more than one viable corporate successor exists. In Trimper v. BrunoSherman Corp., 436 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Mich. 1977), a plaintiff injured by a
press punch defectively manufactured by T.W. & C.B. Sheridan Company
sought to recover from Sheridan's corporate successors. The assets of Sheridan had been sold to Harris Intertype Corporation (the same corporate transaction analyzed in Turner). Harris manufactured Sherman presses for six
years and then sold the Sherman assets to Bruno-Sherman Corporation.
Harris continued its operation in other fields, while Bruno-Sherman began
manufacturing Sheridan presses. Following a discussion of Turner, which it
characterized as "classic vicarious liability," 436 F. Supp. at 351, the Trimper
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cently enacted Nebraska products liability statute of repose, 120 the
court's concern with the passage of time was misplaced. The statute provides a four-year time limitation for products liability actions. It also provides that any products liability action shall be
commenced within ten years after the date when the product
which allegedly caused the personal injury, death, or damage was
court addressed the liability issue. Reserving the issue of Harris' continuing
liability until it was properly raised, the court found that there was "no less
reason for imposing such liability on Bruno-Sherman Corporation in this
case than on Harris Corporation in Turner." Id.
In Trimper v. Harris Corp., 441 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Mich. 1977), the court
was forced to decide the issue it had expressly reserved in its previous opinion. The court found that imposition of liability on Harris was justified because "[b]y terms of the sale from Harris Corporation to Bruno-Sherman
Corporation, Harris Corporation made it possible for Bruno-Sherman Corporation to continue the illusion of continuity of enterprise between the original
manufacturer and Bruno-Sherman Corporation." Id. at 347. Allowing the
plaintiff to sue both Harris and Bruno-Sherman was found to be consistent
with policies espoused in Turner. The court concluded by stating that "[i] t is
not the injured party's concern as to how that liability, if he wins his suit, will
be allocated or borne as between them." Id. The Trimper opinions are discussed in detail in Products Liability,supra note 19, at 380-85.
A companion case to Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431
A.2d 811 (1981), Nieves v. Bruno-Sherman Corp. and Harris Corp., 86 N.J. 361,
431 A.2d 826 (1981), addressed the issue presented in the Trimper opinions
under the asupices of the product line exception. The facts in Nieves were
essentially the same as in Trimper, including the identity of the corporate
successors. In Nieves, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that both BrunoSherman and Harris were amenable to suit under the Ray analysis.
Because Bruno-Sherman continues to manufacture Sheridan presses, the
court had little trouble finding that it could be liable under the Ray analysis.
Harris argued, that because the plaintiff could seek recovery from BrunoSherman, and because Bruno-Sherman currently marketed the offending
product line, it should be excused from liability. The court disagreed, stating
that the Ray court had been concerned "not as much with the availability of
one particular viable successor as it was with the unavailability of the original manufacturer by reason of its divestiture of assets and dissolution." Id.
at 370-71, 431 A.2d at 831. The court found that "Harris 'became an integral
part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the
cost of injuries resulting from defective products,"' by acquiring, producing,
and later selling the Sheridan business assets. Id. at 371, 431 A.2d at 831 (citations omitted). The court stated that "Harris's [sic] prominent role in the
overall enterprise of manufacturing Sheridan die-cutting presses is not to be
overlooked merely because plaintiff's injury did not occur while Harris actually engaged in the manufacturing operation." Id. In conclusion, the court
said.
[w] hile the Ramirez rationale is concerned with imposing strict tort
liability for damages caused by defects in units of the product line
acquired and continued by successor manufacturers, neither Ramirez nor the injured plaintiff ... is concerned with how that liability
will be allocated or borne as between two successor corporations.
Id. at 372, 431 A.2d at 832.
120. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 25-224 (1979).
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first sold or leased.21 Thus, although imposition of liability on
some manufacturers and successors seems unfair because a great
length of time has passed between the date of sale and the date of
injury, that factor should have been irrelevant in Jones.
The court advanced the passage of time as a reason to maintain
the traditional corporate law rule despite a legislative solution to
that problem. Interestingly, the court's final justification for not
holding Amsted liable was that this matter involves broad public
policy issues which are more appropriately left to legislative determination.122 Since legislatures are able to receive input from a
considerably broader spectrum of society than are courts, this argument carries a certain appeal. Unfortunately for injured persons, legislative action is often slow, if forthcoming at all.1 23 It
should be remembered that strict liability itself is a creation of the
courts.124 If a remedy which imposes liability without fault can be
created by courts in order to afford greater protection to those injured by defective products, it does not seem beyond the court's
competence to extend the liability flowing from that remedy to corporate successors in order to more adequately protect the same
class of persons.
C.

Balancing Competing Policies and Concluding Remarks

The problems associated with obtaining a proper balance between the rights of persons injured by defective products and the
interest of business concerns in being able to calculate effectively
the potential liability attaching in an assets acquisition are complex. Each of the approaches taken by courts in dealing with these
problems have some advantages and disadvantages. On balance,
however, the Ray product line exception approach seems the most
satisfactory.
The traditional rule of non-liability, in a sale of assets transaction, affords businesses the opportunity to determine definitely the
liabilities assumed by the transferee. This result allows the par121. Id. Plaintiff Jones' action was not barred because his injury occurred prior to
July 22, 1978. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224(4) (1979) allows claims accruing before
that date to be brought within two years of such date.
122. Jones, 211 Neb. at 730, 320 N.W.2d at 484.
123. In its last attempt to pass comprehensive products liability legislation, the
Nebraska Unicameral failed. LB. 142 died on the floor. 2 NEB. LEG. J. 2333
(1978).
124. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963) (first case to hold manufacturers of defective products
strictly liable in tort); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-68,
150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). The Nebraska Supreme
Court adopted the doctrine of strict products liability in Kohler v. Ford Motor
Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971).
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ties to the transaction to arrive at a purchase price with some degree of certainty, thus enhancing the marketability of business
enterprises. The traditional approach, however, provides this certainty at the expense of persons injured by products manufactured
by the predecessor, a result which could not be obtained had the
transaction been structured as a merger or sale of stock. This exaltation of form over substance is analogous to the problems of privity and notice which led to the original adoption of the doctrine of
strict products liability.125
Even as expanded by Knapp and Cyr, the exceptions to the
traditional rule are subject to criticism. By focusing on commonality of ownership and similarities between the transferor and transferee entities, the method of corporate acquisition remains the
determining factor in the imposition of liability. Although the exceptions to the traditional rule provide sufficient protection for
claims accruing prior to or shortly after the dissolution of the predecessor, such as the claims of business creditors or disgruntled
shareholders, they remain unresponsive to claims of persons injured by defectively manufactured products. Such claims frequently arise long after the dissolution of the original
manufacturer.
By abandoning the traditional approach in suits involving products liability claims against corporate successors, the Turner and
Ray approaches more adequately address the rights of persons injured by defectively manufactured products than does the traditional rule and its exceptions. The Turner approach, however,
remains subject to some of the same criticisms applicable to the
traditional rule and its exceptions. By focusing on the similarity
between the corporate makeup of the transferor and transferee,
the Turner test still allows the parties to the transaction to determine the rights of injured persons. Because the Turner approach
is based on continuity between the predecessor and the successor,
it presents formidable problems to business planners. It will not
always be readily apparent at the time of the acquisition how similar to the predecessor the successor will be. Thus, in arriving at a
purchase price, the acquiring company will be forced to guess
whether the successor corporation will be sufficiently similar to its
predecessor to engender liability under the Turner approach.
The Ray product line exception seems the best approach to the
problem. By emphasizing the continuation of the product line
125. The abrogation of the doctrines of privity and notice which in turn led to the
creation of strict products liability is detailed in Prosser, The Fallof the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MmN. L. REv. 791 (1966). See also
Henningsen v. Bloonifield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (leading
case).
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causing the injury, the Ray analysis comes closest to an effective
balance between the competing concerns of business planners and
injured parties. If the success of a given product line provided the
incentive for a corporation to purchase the assets of another corporation and to continue manufacturing that product in a substantially similar manner, it does not seem unfair to force the
successor to accept responsibility for the liabilities inherent in that
manufacturing process. If, on the other hand, the product line of
the predecessor is unsuccessful, or if it has engendered substantial
product liability in the past, the corporate planners of the successor may choose to discontinue the product line, and thus avoid future liability for products defectively manufactured by the original
corporate entity.
In Jones, the Nebraska Supreme Court was forced to make a
basic policy judgment. It chose to follow the position taken by the
majority of courts in the United States, and thus adopted the traditional rule of successor non-liability in a sale of assets transaction.
Because of the number of courts so holding, and because of the
universal acceptance afforded the traditional rule until recently, it
is difficult to characterize the court's decision as wrong. However,
given the recent trend toward imposing liability on successors, and
given the fact that the impetus for that trend is firmly grounded in
policy considerations, the result in Jones would be infinitely more
satisfying had it been reached on the basis of a thorough examination of those policy concerns.
Shawn Renner '84

